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Abstract
We present a framework for speciﬁcation and security analysis of communication protocols for mobile wireless networks. This
setting introduces new challenges which are not being addressed by classical protocol analysis techniques. The main complication
stems from the fact that the actions of intermediate nodes and their connectivity can no longer be abstracted into a single unstructured
adversarial environment as they form an inherent part of the system’s security. In order to model this scenario faithfully, we present a
broadcast calculus which makes a clear distinction between the protocol processes and the network’s connectivity graph, which may
change independently from protocol actions.We identify a property characterising an important aspect of security in this setting and
express it using behavioural equivalences of the calculus. We complement this approach with a control ﬂow analysis which enables
us to automatically check this property on a given network and attacker speciﬁcation.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In classical cellular wireless networking, devices connect to a dedicated base station providing services such as
Internet access. Considering the threats implied in using the wireless medium, security has always been a natural
concern in this setting. In order to increase convenience and mobility of users even further, much research effort has
been spent in recent years on the development of protocols for networks operating without central control components
so that nodes connect directly to each other and forward messages over multiple hops. This networking paradigm
is dubbed “mobile ad hoc networking” and some of the proposed protocols have been standardised by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) or are in the process of standardisation.
Security is again amajor concern in this new setting, however, the added complexity asks for new securitymodels and
properties which do not yet seem to be well understood. For example, the signature mechanism of the “secure” routing
protocol extension SAODV [13] clearly strives for the authentication of endpoint nodes of a yet to be established routing
path. However, the task of any routing protocol is to discover and maintain paths between communication partners in
a network, and this service itself should be secured. As SAODV’s authentication property does not imply statements
about paths, it is unclear how the securing of the service is to be achieved.
To ensure the correctness of any protocol, formal modelling and analysis techniques are to be employed. This
approach has proved to be successful with security protocols for properties like authentication and conﬁdentiality,
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and a multitude of effective frameworks have been proposed, e.g. [8,24,2,12] to name only a few. The above example
reveals, however, that these formalisms cannot be applied in this new setting because they are designed for endpoint
properties. The goal of this paper is to present a framework, based on a broadcast calculus and static analysis, which
allows mobile wireless networks and their security to be formally described and analysed. In the following, we review
some of the characteristics of mobile ad hoc networking, summarise related work and our contributions, and give an
overview of the structure of this paper.
1.1. Background: mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile ad hoc networks consist of mobile devices communicating via wireless transmission. Nodes cooperate by
relaying messages to distant partners, thus eliminating the need for any pre-installed infrastructure and overcoming the
limitations of their respective radio transmission ranges. In order to achieve this behaviour, multiple protocols have to
work together. Their design is carried out within a layered architecture, so that protocols on higher layers can abstract
from functionality supplied by those beneath. For mobile ad hoc networks, the network layer is critical as routing is
the central issue.
Routing comprises two complementary tasks: route discovery and route maintenance. For route discovery, a node
usually ﬂoods the network with a route request message which is rebroadcast over and over by intermediate nodes
until the destination node is found and can acknowledge. Found routes are kept in routing tables for later use. Route
maintenance tries on the other hand to repair routes (by ﬁnding alternatives) whenever a link between nodes on a route
breaks. Broken links are considered to occur frequently, as nodes are free to move about.
Routing protocols are further distinguished into proactive (nodes constantly try to update their routing tables ac-
cording to the changing network topology) and on-demand (routes are on), with the proactive approach seen as less
advantageous because it produces a greater routing overhead on the network. Protocols under standardisation at the
IETF include ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing [25] and dynamic source routing (DSR) [16], both
on-demand protocols. These are developed for a non-adversarial setting only, and security extensions such as SAODV
[14], Ariadne [15], and ARAN [29] have been proposed to secure the routing effort.
To summarise, main characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks include the following and clarify the issues any
modelling formalism for this setting has to address:
Internal states: Nodes are not memoryless but store information in routing tables with impact on future actions.
Broadcast communication: Routing protocols rely on broadcast as the main mode of communication, together with
some notion of locality: only adjacent nodes receive the initial broadcast message.
Connectivity: Connectivity of nodes is a separate parameter to the system and protocols promise to give correct
results for any value of this parameter.
Dynamic environment: The connectivity undergoes constant changes as the result of link failures.
1.2. Related work
There are not many works on bringing together the development of protocols for mobile ad hoc networks with formal
modelling and security analysis (our own preliminary studies are [18,19]). Related work is thus to be found mainly in
the separate areas of process algebra, protocol analysis, and non-formal security analysis for mobile ad hoc networks.
In the realm of process algebra, broadcast calculi, distributed calculi, and calculi with security objectives are most
closely related to our work. The calculus of broadcasting systems (CBS) [27] is the ﬁrst calculus to have broadcast as
communication primitive, and is a direct ancestor of our calculus. As a main difference to our approach, all processes
receive a broadcast message at once, whereas we emphasise the necessity of a notion of local broadcast in which only
adjacent nodes can directly receive a transmitted message. The b-calculus [11] equips the -calculus with a broadcast
paradigm such that only nodes listening on the right channel will receive a broadcast.While this seems to come closer to
a notion of local broadcast, it remains complicated to change a once established connectivity (which is straightforward
in our calculus).
Process calculi have been enriched with locations to describe distributed mobile computation. Mobile Ambients [9]
model located places for parallel computation which can be nested in order to reason about process mobility. Klaim [3]
is a language which owes concepts to both process algebra and coordination languages. Locality variables and a
so-called allocation environment permit writing programs for distributed environments while ignoring their precise
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allocations.While we use locations and a style of notation similar to mobile ambients, our approach distinguishes itself
from these and similar calculi by relating locations and connectivity speciﬁcally for the purpose of modelling wireless
communication.
In the area of calculiwith security objectives, the spi calculus [2]was theﬁrst calculus to include explicit cryptographic
primitives. Our approach follows however more closely the applied pi calculus [1] which allows functions as term
constructors and uses them tomodel cryptography. In both approaches security is expressedwith the help of behavioural
equivalences for processes. The calculi LySa [5] and LySaNS [7] are spi calculus variants with powerful modelling
constructs (patternmatching) which focus on establishing security results directly via static analysis without developing
behavioural equivalences.
Model checking has been used to analyse traditional security protocols speciﬁed in a process algebra framework [28].
Static analysis techniques for the same task have been employed by Bodei et al. [5] and stimulated our own approach.
Bhargavan et al. [4], Zakiuddin et al. [32], Chiyangwa et al. [10] and Wibling et al. [31] have used model checking to
discover ﬂaws in routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks, but consider only safety problems.
Work on the security of mobile ad hoc networks includes [14,15,29], which propose secure protocols or protocol
extensions and informally consider attacks and desired properties.
1.3. Contributions
Our main contributions can be summarised as follows:
• Deﬁnition of the calculus CBS for the faithful formalisation of protocols for mobile wireless networks. Its main
novelties include: local broadcast as main communication model; separation of process connectivity (represented
by graphs on locations) and process actions; explicit notion of a computational entity as a pair of process and private
store at some location.
• The deﬁnition of topology consistency as a building block for routing security, formalised using the notion of
mediated process equivalence which focuses on identifying processes only with respect to their capabilities to store
items.
• A static analysis to overapproximate actions of a ﬁnite network of nodes speciﬁed in CBS, which can be used to
automatically derive the topology consistency condition.
1.4. Outline of the paper
In Section 2, the syntax and operational semantics of the calculus CBS are deﬁned andwe present related behavioural
equivalences. Section 3 presents a control ﬂow analysis on terms of our calculus to yield an overapproximation of the
sets of terms transmitted and stored in a network.We prove the analysis correct with respect to the operational semantics
of the calculus and give notes about our implementation of the analysis. In Section 4, we analyse the security needs
of mobile wireless networks and compare them with classical security protocols. We specify SAODV, a simpliﬁed
version of SAODV, as a worked example of protocol modelling in CBS. We formalise topology consistency as an
important property in the setting of routing protocols and apply our analysis to show thatSAODVviolates this property.
We conclude with notes on future work in Section 5.
2. The calculus CBS
In this section we present CBS, a process calculus for modelling mobile wireless networks. It inherits broadcast
as the base communication paradigm from the CBS [27], with the important difference that sent messages are not
received globally, but only by adjacent neighbours of the sending node. The notion of adjacency is made explicit by the
concept of a connectivity graph, which effectively separates process actions from process connectivity. This separation
is essential for modelling mobile wireless networks since the possibility of a connection is determined by environment
conditions such as node movement, but never by process actions.
For security modelling, we develop notions of behavioural equivalences of networks, much in the style of the spi
calculus [2]. However, security will be determined by the tense relation between the actual environment conditions
and what nodes believe about their environment (see later Section 4.3). The belief of the nodes can be expressed in
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Table 1
Syntax of CBS
Terms
T ::= n Names, n ∈ N
| x Variables, x ∈ X
| f (T˜ ) Function application, f ∈ F
Processes
P ::= nil Termination
| out T . P Sending
| in x. P Reception
| store T . P Storage
| read x. P Retrieval
| case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2 Case distinction, f ∈ F
| P1 | P2 Parallel composition
| !P Replication
Networks
N ::= n[P, S] Node, n ∈ Nloc ⊆ N, S non-empty set of terms
| N1 ‖ N2 Parallel composition
CBS by modelling routing tables using the notion of a private store, and the notion of mediated equivalence focuses
on identifying networks by their storage capabilities.
2.1. Syntax and informal semantics
The syntax of CBS is given in Table 1.
Terms: Let N denote a countable set of names, X a countable set of variables, and F a ﬁnite set of function symbols
together with a function arity : F → N to yield the arity of a function symbol. The set of terms T consists of names
n ∈ N, variables x ∈ X, and function applications f (T1, . . . , Tk) where Ti ∈ T, f ∈ F and arity(f ) = k.
We write T˜ to abbreviate a ﬁnite sequence of terms T1, . . . , Tk for some k ∈ N, and use the function | . | to denote its
arity, |T˜ | = k. Function fv yields the set of free variables of a term, process, or node. A free variable x can be replaced
with a term U by the substitution [U/x]. We write [U˜/x˜] and [Ui/xi]ki=1 to denote the sequence of substitutions[U1/x1] . . . [Uk/xk].
Processes: The set of processes P is inductively deﬁned as follows: the terminated process is represented by nil. The
sending of a ground term T is denoted by out T . P , with P as the continuation process. The sending mode is local
broadcast, i.e. only adjacent nodes may receive the transmission, where adjacency is deﬁned below via the notion of
connectivity graphs. The action in x. P expresses readiness to receive a ground term T and then to continue as P with
T substituted for x.
The action store T . P denotes storage of a ground term T in a private store S introduced below. Terms are retrieved
from the store by the action read x. P which non-deterministically chooses a term T ∈ S then continues as P with T
substituted for x. A form of matching can be used to select terms as demonstrated in Section 2.3.
The action for case distinction case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2 tries to match a term T with the term f (T˜ ; x˜) and
continues on success with P1 where U˜ is substituted for x˜, or otherwise with P2. In order to match, T has to be of the
form f (T˜ , U˜ ) with |U˜ | = |˜x|. Processes can be executed in parallel, written as P1 | P2. Multiple parallel actions are
abbreviated by |i∈I Pi . !P is the operator which allows to express inﬁnite behaviours by producing as many copies of
P as are needed.
Stores: Stores are non-empty sets of terms. The set constructor {.} and the operations union ∪ and element ∈ are
deﬁned for them and enjoy the usual properties. For singleton sets, the set brackets can be dropped. For instance, the
union of singleton sets T1 and T2 can be written T1 ∪ T2 or {T1, T2}. Stores are deﬁned non-empty to prevent the read
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operation from getting stuck. If no particular initialisation of stores is wished for, this can be achieved by singleton stores
ε, where ε is a distinguished term, called the empty term. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, we will assume this initialisation.
Networks: Networks N ∈ N consist of nodes which are written as n[P, S] and denote a computational entity of a
network: a pair of a process P and a private store S at some location n. Locations are contained in the set Nloc ⊆ N and
make it possible to identify nodes. For a network N we deﬁne V (N) to yield the set of all locations (vertices) in N .
Networks can be composed in parallel by N1 ‖ N2, where again multiple composition can be written ‖i∈I Ni .
2.2. Operational semantics
2.2.1. Connectivity graphs and network topologies
A graph is a pair G = (V ,E) where V is a set, called the set of vertices, and E is a set of unordered pairs of vertices,
called the set of edges, with (m, n) ∈ E implies m = n (no self-loops). The set of vertices of a graph G can be referred
to as V (G), and the set of edges as E(G).
A connectivity graph G is a graph whose vertex set is a subset of Nloc. Connectivity graphs are used to describe the
connections betweennodes for a particularmoment in time.G is said to beadmissibleon a networkN iffV (N) ⊆ V (G).
A network topology T is a non-empty collection of connectivity graphs. The network topology is used to implicitly
describe connectivity properties which remain invariant over time, for example, if a certain link always or never exists.
T is said to be admissible on a networkN iff allG ∈ T are. In the followingwewill assume that all examined connectivity
graphs and network topologies are admissible on their respective networks.Themaximal network topology Tmax contains
all graphs on Nloc.
2.2.2. Transition relations
The operational semantics of the calculus is deﬁned by the following transition relations:
N
(U,m)−−−−→G N ′ Labelled transition relation
N → N ′ Reduction relation
N ≡ N ′ Structural equivalence
Labelled transition relation: The labelled transition relation N (U,m)−−−−→G N ′ describes the evolution of a network
N to a network N ′ during sending of the ground term U by node m, where N abides by a connectivity graph G: only
nodes n with (m, n) ∈ E(G) may receive U . The explanation of the labelling requires the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Mode identiﬁers). The set {!, ?, :} is called the set of mode identiﬁers. They can be composed with the
operator ◦ according to the algebra shown below, where ⊥ means that ! cannot be combined with itself.
◦ ! ? :
! ⊥ ! !
? ! ? ?
: ! ? :
Mode identiﬁers are ranged over by the meta variable .
In a label (U,m), the following communication modes can be expressed: sending (U,m)!, reception (U,m)?, and
loss (U,m): of the term U sent out by m.
The relation (U,m)!−−−→G describes network evolution under the sending of one message (U,m) under G. The sending
of k messages is serialised in the sense that k derivations for a sequence of connectivity graphs G1, . . . ,Gk have to be
found:
N
(U1,m1)!−−−−−→G1 N1 (U2,m2)!−−−−−→G2 N2 · · · (Uk,mk)!−−−−−→Gk N ′
Note that this means that there will never be clashes of messages, but sending remains globally asynchronous.
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Table 2
Labelled transition relation
Nil n[nil, S] (U,m):−−−→G n[nil, S]
Out1 n[out T . P, S] (T ,n)!−−−→G n[P, S]
Out2 n[out T . P, S] (U,m):−−−→G n[out T . P, S]
In1
(m, n) ∈ E(G)
n[in x. P, S] (U,m)?−−−−→G n[P [U/x], S]
In2
(m, n) /∈ E(G)
n[in x. P, S] (U,m):−−−→G n[in x. P, S]
Repl1 n[!P, S] (U,m):−−−→G n[!P, S]
PPar
N1
(U,m)1−−−−→G N ′1 N2
(U,m)2−−−−→G N ′2
N1 ‖ N2 (U,m)(1◦2)−−−−−−−→G N ′1 ‖ N ′2
where ◦ is due to Deﬁnition 2.1
Struct
N ≡ M M (U,m)−−−−→G M ′ M ′ ≡ N ′
N
(U,m)−−−−→G N ′
In order to ensure that changes in connectivity are in agreement with the network topology, we deﬁne the following:
Deﬁnition 2.2 (T-Faithfulness). The relation (U,m)−−−−→G is called T-faithful iff G ∈ T, and we write (U,m)−−−−→G∈T to
emphasise this fact.
Moreover, a ﬁnite, possibly empty sequence of T-faithful sending transitions
N
(U1,m1)!−−−−−→G1∈T N1 (U2,m2)!−−−−−→G2∈T N2 · · · (Uk,mk)!−−−−−→Gk∈T N ′
can be written as N −→∗T N ′.
After this overview, we can now proceed to the rules for the labelled transition relation which are given in Table 2.
Rule Nil expresses that the node running the nil process n[nil, S] loses any message (U,m). Rules Out1 and
Out2 describe the behaviour of a sender n[out T . P, S] . Such a node loses incoming messages (U,m) and evolves to
n[P, S] when broadcasting its own message. In the latter case, the transition arrow is labelled with (T , n)!, showing
the transmitted term T and the location of the sender n.
There are two rules for a receiver n[in x. P, S] which are distinguished by the properties of the connectivity graph
G. According to rule In1, the message (U,m) is received if there is an edge in G between location m, the sender of the
message, and the current node’s location n. In this case the variable x in P is replaced by U so that the continuation
process is P [U/x]. If, however, (m, n) /∈ E(G), any message will be lost by rule In2.
A node running the replication process n[!P, S] evolves to itself and loses any message (U,m), as described by rule
Repl1. Note that rule Repl2 (see Table 3, reduction relation) provides for the expected expansion !P = P | !P .
The rule for parallelism PPar makes use of the algebra for the composition ◦ of 1, 2 ∈ {!, ?, :} which is due to
Deﬁnition 2.1. This is essential for the working of the broadcast modelling, as it makes sure that every subprocess
running at every node in the network will decide about receiving or losing a particular message.
It is easy to see that the properties “! ◦ ! = ⊥” (i.e., ! ◦ ! is not allowed) and “1 ◦ 2 ∈ {?, :} ⇒ 1, 2 = !” of the
algebra in Deﬁnition 2.1 ensure that at most one process can execute a sending action in any transition step.
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Table 3
Reduction relation
Repl2 n[!P, S] → n[P | !P, S]
Store n[store T . P, S] → n[P, S ∪ T ]
Read T ∈ S
n[read x. P, S] → n[P [T/x], S]
Case1
T = f (T˜ , U˜ ) |U˜ | = |˜x|
n[case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] → n[P1[U˜/x˜], S]
Case2
 U˜ . T = f (T˜ , U˜ ) ∧ |U˜ | = |˜x|
n[case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] → n[P2, S]
Example 2.3. Let three nodes be deﬁned as follows:
N1
def= n1[out T .nil, S1] , N2 def= n2[in x.nil, S2] , N3 def= n3[in x.nil, S3] ,
and let E(G1) = {(n1, n2)} and T = {G1}. Then the network consisting of the parallel composition of the nodes can
evolve according to the following derivation:
N1
(T ,n1)!−−−−→G1∈T n1[nil, S1]
N2
(T ,n1)?−−−−→G1∈T n2[nil, S2] N3 (T ,n1):−−−−→G1∈T N3
N2 ‖ N3 (T ,n1)?−−−−→G1∈T n2[nil, S2] ‖ N3
N1 ‖ N2 ‖ N3 (T ,n1)!−−−−→G1∈T n1[nil, S1] ‖ n2[nil, S2] ‖ N3
If on the other hand T = {G1,G2}, where E(G2) = {(n1, n3)}, then we can conclude that the ﬁnal conﬁguration will
either be
n1[nil, S1] ‖ n2[in x.nil, S2] ‖ n3[nil, S3]
or
n1[nil, S1] ‖ n2[nil, S2] ‖ n3[in x.nil, S3] .
Note that T models in this case the particular scenario in which either n2 or n3 are able to receive T . If we were to model
full mobility instead (so that also both or neither of the n2 and n3 might receive T ), additional network connectivity
graphs would have to be added to T.
Reduction relation: We display rules for the reduction relation in Table 3.
n[!P, S] reduces to n[P | !P, S] , thereby producing one copy of process P . The interplay of Red,Par, and
Trans of the structural equivalence makes sure that as many copies of P can be produced as needed. In rule Store,
n[store T . P, S] adds a term T to the store S. Rule Read for retrieval n[read x. P, S] replaces x in P by an arbitrary
term T ∈ S. In the rules for case distinction, the term T is matched against a template f (T˜ ; x˜). In rule Case1, if T is
of the form f (T˜ , U˜ ) and |U˜ | = |˜x|, the continuation binds the terms U˜ against the variables x˜ to yield n[P1[U˜/x˜], S] .
Otherwise, rule Case2 demands P2 as continuation process.
Example 2.4. Assume the following deﬁnition:
N
def= n[case T of Env(n; x) store x.nil else nil, S] .
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Table 4
Structural equivalence
Comm N1 ‖ N2 ≡ N2 ‖ N1
Assoc N1 ‖ (N2 ‖ N3) ≡ (N1 ‖ N2) ‖ N3
Reﬂ N ≡ N
Sym N
′ ≡ N
N ≡ N ′
Trans N ≡ N ′′ N ′′ ≡ N ′
N ≡ N ′
Comp
N1 ≡ N ′1
N1 ‖ N2 ≡ N ′1 ‖ N2
Red N → N ′
N ≡ N ′
Par n[P1 | P2, S1 ∪ S2] ≡ n[P1, S1] ‖ n[P2, S2]
For T = Env(n;msg), an envelope addressed to n with contents msg , we have the following derivation:
N → n[store msg .nil, S] → n[nil, S ∪ msg] .
For T = Env(m;msg) we would however get n[nil, S] as ﬁnal conﬁguration, since n = m.
Structural equivalence: The rules of the structural equivalence on nodes are shown in Table 4.
Rules Comm through Trans are standard. We regard networks as structurally equivalent, if one of them can be
reduced to the other, as shown in rule Red. Rule Par says that two parallel processes running at location n can be
viewed as two separate nodes at n which run these processes and have access to the contents of the original store as
necessary.
Example 2.5. We have the following equivalences, where the second holds because of Comp, Red, and Store, the
other two because of Par.
n[store T .nil | in x.nil, S] ≡ n[store T .nil, S] ‖ n[in x.nil, S]
≡ n[nil, S ∪ T ] ‖ n[in x.nil, S] ≡ n[nil | in x.nil, S ∪ T ] .
2.3. Notational conventions and cryptographic primitives
For the speciﬁcation of even moderately large protocols such as SAODV in Section 4.2, clarity and readability
of the formalisation are imperative. For this reason, we have opted for keywords such as in and read rather than just
symbols which are favoured by other calculi. We also use intelligible identiﬁers for names, variables, and functions,
and omit a trailing nil whenever no confusion arises. In this section we introduce some more notational conventions
and show a way to model cryptographic primitives in CBS.
Notation: If the equality of terms is to be checked, the full power of the matching mechanism of the case statement
is not needed and a simpler representation is desirable. This can be done with the following encoding which uses the
special function Match to allow arbitrary terms T and U , since case can only match terms which a function has been
applied to.
if T = U then P1 else P2 ≡ case Match(T ) of Match(U ; ) P1 else P2
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If in and read are directly followed by a case distinction on their input variable, we use the following simpliﬁed
notation.
in f (T˜ ; x˜). P ≡ in x. case x of f (T˜ ; x˜) P else nil, x /∈ fv(P )
read f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2 ≡ read x. case x of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, x /∈ fv(P )
Cryptographic primitives: In order to express public-key digital signatures we use key pairs
(PubKey(seed),PrivKey(seed)) created from the same seed by applying functions PubKey and PrivKey. A
signature of term T under private key PrivKey(seed) then simply corresponds to applying the function Sign to yield
Sign(PrivKey(seed), T ). Checking of the signature amounts to verifying that the seeds of the known public key and
the private key used for the encryptions are the same, and that the right term T has been signed. As shown in the
following deﬁnition, this procedure can be completely hidden in the protocol speciﬁcation by deﬁnition of the action
checksig, where seed is a fresh variable, seed /∈ fv(P1).
checksig sig pubkey T P1 else P2 ≡
case pubkey of PubKey(; seed)
case sig of Sign(PrivKey(seed), T ; ) P1 else P2
else
P2
This style of speciﬁcation can be applied analogously to asymmetric encryption and, simpler, symmetric encryption
as is shown with the following deﬁnitions.
asymdec msg privkey content P1 else P2 ≡
case privkey of PrivKey(; seed)
case msg of AsymEnc(PubKey(seed); content) P1 else P2
else
P2
symdec msg symkey content P1 else P2 ≡
case msg of SymEnc(symkey; content) P1 else P2
For a Dolev-Yao style attacker speciﬁcation, one will then equip the attacker with asymdec and symdec and the ability
to apply the functions Sign, AsymEnc, and SymEnc, but not the function PrivKey.
2.4. Behavioural equivalences
In this section, we deﬁne several notions of equivalences for networks.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (T-Bisimilarity). The relation S is called a T-simulation if N SM implies: whenever N (U,m)−−−−→G∈T N ′
then, for some M ′, M (U,m)−−−−→G∈T M ′ and N ′ SM ′. S is called a T-bisimulation if both S and its converse are
T-simulations. T-bisimilarity, written ∼T, is the largest T-bisimulation.
T-bisimilarity allows for reasoning about networks on speciﬁc topologies as the following two examples show.
As usual, since ∼T is equal to the union of all T-bisimulations, T-bisimilarity of two networks N and M is shown by
deﬁning a set S ⊆ N × N with (N,M) ∈ S and proving that it is a T-bisimulation.
Example 2.7.
(1) Let T be a network topology isolating n, i.e. ∀ G ∈ T. m. (m, n) ∈ E(G). Then,
n[in x. P, S] ∼T n[nil, S] .
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(2) If G ∈ T implies (n,m) ∈ E(G) ⇔ (n′,m) ∈ E(G) for all m ∈ V (G), then
n[in x.nil, S] ‖ n′[in x.nil, S] ∼T n[in x.nil, S] .
Proof. (1) Let S = {(n[in x. P, S] , n[nil, S] )}. Since n is isolated, In2 is the only rule applicable to n[in x. P, S] and
n[in x. P, S] (U,m):−−−→G∈T n[in x. P, S] is the only derivation we can assume. n[nil, S] can simulate this with Nil:
n[nil, S] (U,m):−−−→G∈T n[nil, S] . The converse direction is analogous.
(2) Take S = {P ∈ {in x.nil,nil} : (n[P, S] ‖ n′[P, S] , n[P, S] )}. 
If networks are sought to be equivalent on any given network topology, one has to resort to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Bisimilarity). Networks N and M are said to be bisimilar, written N ∼ M , if they are Tmax-bisimilar.
Recall from Section 2.2 that Tmax contains all graphs on Nloc.
The examples show that terminated nodes or nodes which no longer interact with the environment are insigniﬁcant
with respect to network interaction.
Example 2.9.
(1) n[nil, ε] ‖ N ∼ N .
(2) If n /∈ V (N) then n[nil, S] ‖ N ∼ N .
(3) n[read x.nil, S] ∼ n[nil, S].
(4) n[store T .nil, S] ∼ n[nil, S].
(5) n[nil, S] ∼ m[nil, S].
Again, these propositions are proved by ﬁnding an appropriate T-bisimulation S in each case. Note for (2) that n /∈
V (N) prevents N from acquiring yet unknown terms from S which could be sent and thus distinguish the networks.
The presented notion of bisimilarity distinguishes networks by their communication capabilities.
• Whenever a node n of network N sends, i.e. label (U,m)!, a node with the same name n in network M is also ready
to send.
• Whenever one or more nodes in network N receive, i.e. label (U,m)?, one or more nodes in the network M will
also receive.
• Whenever the complete network N loses a term, i.e. label (U,m):, all the nodes of the network M lose the term as
well.
Internal actions such as storage and retrieval are ignored as long as they do not interfere with the communication
capabilities, as shown in Example 2.9 (3) and (4). However, n[store T . P, S] /∼ n[P, S] for arbitrary P if T /∈ S,
since (T , n)! can distinguish them.
In order to distinguish networks by their capability to store terms, without having to rely on the existence of
distinguishing communication actions, we deﬁne a barbed equivalence. The barb predicate N ↓n U (deﬁned in
Table 5) holds if N can “immediately” store term U at location n, i.e. without requiring another network interaction.
Table 5
Barb predicate
Barb-Empty N ↓n ε
Barb-Store n[store T . P, S] ↓n T
Barb-Struct
N ≡ N ′ N ′ ↓n U
N ↓n U
Barb-PPar
N ↓n U
N ‖ M ↓n U
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Table 6
Convergence predicate
Conv-Barb
N ↓n U
N ⇓Tn U
Conv-Comm
N
(U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′ N ′ ⇓Tn U
N ⇓Tn U
Deﬁnition 2.10 (Barbed equivalence). A relation S is called a barbed simulation if whenever (N,M) ∈ S
(1) N ↓n U implies M ↓n U for each barbU and n ∈ V (N) ∩ V (M).
(2) N (U,m)−−−−→G∈Tmax N ′ implies M
(U,m)−−−−→G∈Tmax M ′ for some M ′ and
(N ′,M ′) ∈ S.
S is called a barbed bisimulation if both S and S−1 are barbed simulations. Barbed equivalence, written .∼, is the largest
barbed bisimulation.
As the following example shows, barbed equivalence will distinguish some networks which before were identiﬁed
by bisimilarity.
Example 2.11. n[store T .nil, S] ./∼ n[nil, S] .
More generally, the following results can be checked by examining the deﬁnitions of the equivalences:
Theorem 2.12.
(1) N ∼ M implies N ∼T M for any T.
(2) N .∼ M implies N ∼ M .
Proof. (1) Fix a topology T and assume N ∼ M . By deﬁnition of bisimilarity, there exists a Tmax-bisimulation S such
that if N SM and N (U,m)−−−−→G∈Tmax N ′ then, for some M ′, M
(U,m)−−−−→G∈T M ′ and N ′ SM ′. Because T ⊆ Tmax, S is also
a T-bisimulation.
(2) By deﬁnition, barbed equivalence provides a Tmax-bisimulation S. 
However, it turns out that barbed equivalence is too ﬁne grained to be useful for security analysis. This is
because the desired security property (deﬁned later in Section 4.3) only regards storage actions as crucial for se-
curity because they describe a long-term commitment of a node (an item put in a routing table will be used
again and again); it does not matter on the other hand which messages are transmitted on the network (a se-
cure protocol will just discard forged messages). For this the convergence predicate N ⇓Tn U is deﬁned in Ta-
ble 6 and holds if N will eventually store U (possibly after some interactions under network topology T) at
location n.
The barb and convergence predicates observe terms which can be understood as (structured) data that can be passed
around in networks. Naturally, some kinds of data are irrelevant for particular observations one wants to make, while
others are crucial. This is the rationale behind the introduction of mediation, which allows us to focus on particular
kinds of data.
Deﬁnition 2.13. A mediator  is a function on terms  : T → T. A mediator  is called simple if (U) ∈ {ε, U} for
all U .
The combination of mediator and convergence predicate then gives rise to the desired notion of equivalence:
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Deﬁnition 2.14 (Mediated equivalence). For given topology T and mediator , we write N T M whenever
N ⇓Tn U implies M ⇓Tn (U) for each barb U and n ∈ V (N) ∩ V (M).
Mediated equivalence, written T , is then deﬁned as follows:
N T M iff N T M and M T N.
The following result relates barbed and mediated equivalence:
Theorem 2.15. N .∼ M implies N idT M , where id represents the identity.
Proof. We show N idT M . The other inclusion follows from symmetry of .∼. By deﬁnition of idT we have to show
that for any term U and for all n ∈ V (N) ∩ V (M): N ⇓Tn U implies M ⇓Tn U . Thus, we ﬁx U and n and show the
following by induction on the inference of N ⇓Tn U :
If N ⇓Tn U and N .∼ M then M ⇓Tn U
Case Conv-Barb: Because N ⇓Tn U is due to Conv-Barb, N ↓n U holds. Because N .∼ M we have M ↓n U by
Deﬁnition 2.10. With rule Conv-Barb we have M ⇓Tn U .
Case Conv-Comm: BecauseN ⇓Tn U is due to Conv-Comm,N (U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′ andN ′ ⇓Tn U hold. BecauseN .∼ M
we have that there exists M ′ such that M (U,m)!−−−→G∈T M ′ (∗) and N ′ .∼ M ′.We can thus apply the induction hypothesis
to have M ′ ⇓Tn U . With (∗) and Conv-Comm we have M ⇓Tn U . 
The mediator  : T → T is needed because the storage of some terms can be considered secure. It is used to ﬁne
tune the equivalence to the respective protocol speciﬁcation. The next example illustrates this.
Example 2.16. Let a mediator S and two networks N and M(U) be deﬁned as follows:
S(U) =
{
ε if U = Tsec
U otherwise
N
def= n[in x. store x.nil, S]
M(U)
def= m[out U.nil, S′]
Then, the following holds because N ⇓Tn S(Tsec):
N ‖ M(Tsec) ST N
However, the same is not true if the “secure” term Tsec is replaced by any other term Tattack.
Finally, the following theorem turns out to be helpful, and can be directly proved from the deﬁnition of T and rule
PPar:
Theorem 2.17. For networks N , M and simple mediator , the following holds:
N T N ‖ M
Proof. By deﬁnition of T , where we note that V (N) ∩ V (N ‖ M) = V (N), we have to show the following result:
∀ U. ∀ n ∈ V (N). N ⇓Tn U ⇒ N ‖ M ⇓Tn (U)
Fix thus U = ε and n ∈ V (N), and assume N ⇓Tn U . Because  is simple (see Deﬁnition 2.13), we can do a case
distinction on the value of (U). If (U) = ε, we can show N ‖ M ⇓Tn (U) to hold directly with Conv-Barb and
Barb-Empty.
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Assume thus (U) = ε, i.e. (U) = U , since  is simple. By induction on the shape of the derivation tree for
N ⇓Tn U (only examination of Conv-Comm and Conv-Barb are required) we know that there exists N ′ such that
N −→∗T N ′ and N ′ ↓n U (∗).
We show the following auxiliary result by induction on the length of the derivation sequence for N ′:
N −→kT N ′ ⇒ ∃ M ′. N ‖ M −→kT N ′ ‖ M ′
For k = 0 the result holds vacuously.We assume thatN −→k+1T N ′, which can bewritten asN −→kT N ′′
(U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′.
By induction hypothesis, there exists M ′′ such that N ‖ M −→kT N ′′ ‖ M ′′. By structural induction on M ′′, it can be
shown that there exists M ′ such that M ′′ (U,m)−−−−→G∈T M ′ for either  = ? or  = :. Using PPar on N ′′ (U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′
and M ′′ (U,m)−−−−→G∈T M ′ we can establish the auxiliary result.
To establish the main result, take M ′ such that N ‖ M −→∗T N ′ ‖ M ′ (∗∗), where M ′ exists because of the auxiliary
result. From (∗) and Barb-PPar we have N ′ ‖ M ′ ↓n U , and with Conv-Barb also N ′ ‖ M ′ ⇓Tn U . By ﬁnitely many
applications of Conv-Comm on (∗∗) we have N ‖ M ⇓Tn U . 
3. Control ﬂow analysis
Control ﬂow analysis is a program analysis technique to statically predict safe and computable approximations to the
sets of values which may arise during program execution.While this technique was originally developed for functional
languages [30], it has since then been applied to a variety of programming paradigms, including calculi for concurrency
and security [6,5].
The result of our analysis for a network N yields an overapproximation of
(1) the set of terms which may be transmitted in N , together with their senders, and
(2) the set of terms which may be stored in N , together with the location of the storage.
This will enable us later (see Section 4) to automatically check whether networks are mediated equivalent and prove a
security property for network protocols speciﬁed in CBS.
In this section, we will ﬁrst describe a static abstraction of the network topology T, an important step to limit the
state space arising from network execution.While our abstraction is simple, it retains the important properties we need
for our security analysis. We then specify and describe our analysis and prove its semantic correctness by a subject
reduction theorem and two corollaries relating the network actions sending and storage to our analysis result. We
conclude with a brief overview of our implementation.
3.1. Topology abstractions
The evolution of a network N to a network N ′, formally expressed as N −→∗T N ′, implies that there is a sequence
of graphs G1,G2, . . . ,Gk ∈ T such that
N
(U1,m1)!−−−−−→G1 N1 (U2,m2)!−−−−−→G2 N2 · · · (Uk,mk)!−−−−−→Gk N ′
and the graphs inﬂuence these derivations via rules In1 and In2. Thus, in order to overapproximate behaviour which
might arise in the network, all possible links between senders and receivers have to be considered. Rather than con-
sidering all G ∈ T at any given step which would render infeasible the computation of the analysis, we can be safe by
deﬁning a static abstraction G(T) for T in the following way:
G(T) =
( ⋃
G∈T
V (G),
⋃
G∈T
E(G)
)
.
This means that an abstract network topology G(T) is again a connectivity graph, and contains all G ∈ T as subgraphs.
It also ensures that an analysis over the abstract network topology will enable rule In1 whenever a G ∈ T would have
done it, since
(m, n) ∈ E(G(T)) iff ∃ G ∈ T. (m, n) ∈ E(G). (1)
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On the other hand, the analysis will always be safe with respect to rule In2 because In2 does not lead to the execution
of an action.
3.2. Speciﬁcation
We specify the analysis by a Flow Logic [22,20], which is an approach to static analysis that separates the speci-
ﬁcation of the acceptability of an analysis estimate from its computation. A ﬂow logic speciﬁcation consists of rules
deﬁning a judgement which expresses the relation of estimates and program fragments. The rules have to be interpreted
co-inductively in the sense that an estimate is acceptable if it does not violate the conditions outset in the rules.
In our case, we deﬁne a syntax-directed analysis with the two judgements to range over the different syntactic
categories:
(, ) G(T),n P judgement for processes
(, ) G(T) N judgement for networks
The main judgement for networks (, ) G(T) N reads “(, ) is a valid analysis estimate describing the behaviour of
N under abstract network topology G(T)”. It is parametrised with G(T) and yields the following sets of values:
 ⊆ T × Nloc network cache
 ⊆ T × Nloc store cache
The contents of network and store cache can be intuitively described with the following statements which hold during
execution of network N .
(1) If the term T may be sent from location n, then (T , n) ∈ .
(2) If the term T may be stored at location n, then (T , n) ∈ .
The judgement for processes (, ) G(T),n P is furthermore parametrised with the location n at which the particular
process P is running, and carries the following local environment:
 : X → T substitution environment
Again intuitively, if (x) = U the term U may be bound to variable x during execution of P . By abuse of notation, we
write [U/x] to denote the binding of U to x and also use the substitution environment like a substitution in the sense
of Section 2.1. The empty substitution environment is denoted []. Note that the use of a local environment allows for a
more precise analysis of the case statement in our language than in our previous work [19] or of similar constructs in
LySa [5]. This proves to be crucial for limiting the number of false positives arising from the security analysis. As a
trade-off, there is an increase in the complexity of the analysis. We show in [17] that it holds for both analysis variants
that, given a protocol P run by the nodes of a network N , the worst-case complexity of analysing N is governed by
a polynomial in the size of the universe of values with a degree independent of the size of N . However, this degree is
higher if a local environment is used because it depends additionally on the depth of P and not only on the maximum
arity of functions used in P (as it can be shown in the case of a global environment).
After this overview of the judgements, we turn to the formal speciﬁcation of the analysis in Table 7 and explain the
rules in the following.
Judgement for networks: Rule CFA-Node says that (, ) is a valid analysis result describing the behaviour of node
n[P [Ui/xi]ki=1, S] under abstract connectivity graph G(T) iff it is also a valid analysis result for process P at n with a
fresh variable environment which only contains bindings corresponding to the substitutions [Ui/xi]ki=1 P might carry,
and all terms contained in store S are element of  at n. Rule CFA-PPar is straightforward.
Judgement for processes: Rule CFA-Nil is straightforward. Rule CFA-Out says that the analysis of process out T .
P is achieved by the following: updating the network cache  with terms (T , n) and computing the analysis for the
continuation process P .
Rule CFA-In on the other hand looks at all terms (U,m) recorded in . For an edge (m, n) ∈ E(G(T)), the local
variable environment is updated at x with U and continuation P evaluated under this new environment.
Rule CFA-Store is similar to CFA-Out. However, instead of inserting a term into the network cache, the insertion
is into the store cache  at n, (T , n) ∈ . On the other hand, rule CFA-Read resembles rule CFA-In: terms are now
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Table 7
Control ﬂow analysis for CBS
Judgement for Processes
CFA-Nil (,) G(T),n nil
CFA-Out (,) G(T),n out T . P
iff (T , n) ∈  ∧ (,) G(T),n P
CFA-In (,) G(T),n in x. P
iff ∀ (U,m) ∈ . (m, n) ∈ E(G(T)) ⇒ (,) [U/x]G(T),n P
CFA-Store (,) G(T),n store T . P
iff (T , n) ∈  ∧ (,) G(T),n P
CFA-Read (,) G(T),n read x. P
iff ∀ (U, n) ∈ . (,) [U/x]G(T),n P
CFA-Case (,) G(T),n case T of f (T1 . . . Tj ; xj+1 . . . xk) P1 else P2
iff (T  = f (V1 . . . Vk) ∧∧ji=1 Ti = Vi ⇒ (,) [Vi/xi ]ki=j+1G(T),n P1) ∧
(,) G(T),n P2
CFA-Par (,) G(T),n P1 | P2
iff (,) G(T),n P1 ∧ (,) G(T),n P2
CFA-Repl (,) G(T),n !P
iff (,) G(T),n P
Judgement for Networks
CFA-Node (,) G(T) n[P, S]
iff (,) G(T),n P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈ 
CFA-PPar (,) G(T) N1 ‖ N2
iff (,) G(T) N1 ∧ (,) G(T) N2
taken from the store cache instead of the network cache, and the continuation P is evaluated under the updated variable
environment.
In rule CFA-Case, if T  is of the form f (V1 . . . Vk), it is checked that T1 = V1 ∧ · · · ∧ Tj = Vj , meaning that
the ﬁrst j arguments of f match. Then the continuation P1 is analysed under a substitution environment which maps
xi to Vi for i = j + 1, . . . , k, meaning the remaining arguments of f are bound to the variables xi .
Rule CFA-Par and rule CFA-Repl are straightforward.
3.3. Semantic correctness
In Section 3.2 we have informally stated what elements a valid analysis estimate (, ) will contain. The goal
of this section is to formally establish these statements. Classically, correctness of the analysis is shown by prov-
ing three desirable properties: well-deﬁnedness of the judgements to ensure that the functional they deﬁne has
ﬁxpoints; semantic correctness of the judgements; Moore family property to ensure that the analysis has a most
precise result. Well-deﬁnedness and the Moore family property are straightforward using the techniques described
in [20] and therefore not included in this paper. Semantic correctness with respect to the operational semantics
of Section 2.2 is stated as a subject reduction theorem and proved in this section. Informally, it expresses that
the analysis estimate remains acceptable when the network evolves. From this, statements about  and  follow
directly.
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The following lemma states auxiliary subject reduction results which hold for the reduction relation and structural
equivalence.
Lemma 3.1.
(1) If N → N ′ and (, ) Ĝ N , then (, ) Ĝ N ′.
(2) If N ≡ N ′ and (, ) Ĝ N , then (, ) Ĝ N ′.
Proof. (1) The proof is by induction on the inference of N → N ′.
Case Store: Then N = n[store T . P, S] and N ′ = n[P, S ∪ T ] .
(, ) Ĝ n [store T . P, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
store T . P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (T , n) ∈  ∧ (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Store)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S ∪ T . (U, n) ∈ 
thus (, ) Ĝ n [P, S ∪ T ] (by CFA-Node)
Case Read: Then N = n[read x. P, S] and N ′ = n[P [T/x], S] . From the preconditions of Read we know T ∈ S
(∗).
(, ) Ĝ n [read x. P, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
read x. P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus ∀ (U, n) ∈ . (, ) [U/x]
Ĝ,n
P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Read)
thus (, ) [T/x]
Ĝ,n
P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by (∗))
thus (, ) Ĝ n [P [T/x], S] (by CFA-Node)
Case Case1: Then N = n[case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] and N ′ = n[P1[U˜/x˜], S] , where T = f (T˜ , U˜ ) (∗)
from the preconditions of Case1 and T˜ = T1, . . . , Tj , x˜ = xj+1, . . . , xk , U˜ = Uj+1, . . . , Uk .
(, ) Ĝ n [case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2 ∧
∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (T = f (V1, . . . , Vk) ∧∧ji=1 Ti = Vi ⇒
(, ) 
[Vi/xi ]ki=j+1
Ĝ,n
P1) ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Case)
thus (, ) 
[Ui/xi ]ki=j+1
Ĝ,n
P1 ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by (∗))
thus (, ) Ĝ n [P1[U˜/x˜], S] (by CFA-Node)
Case Case2: Then N = n[case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] and N ′ = n[P2, S] .
(, ) Ĝ n [case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
case T of f (T˜ ; x˜) P1 else P2 ∧
∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P2 ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Case)
thus (, ) Ĝ n [P2, S] (by CFA-Node)
Case Repl2: Then N = n[!P, S] and N ′ = n[P, S] .
(, ) Ĝ n[!P, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) Ĝ n[P, S] (by CFA-Repl)
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(2) The proof is by induction on the inference of N ≡ N ′.
Case Comm: Then N = N1 ‖ N2 and N ′ = N2 ‖ N1.
(, ) Ĝ N1 ‖ N2 (by assumption)
thus (, ) Ĝ N1 ∧ (, ) Ĝ N2 (by CFA-PPar)
thus (, ) Ĝ N2 ‖ N1 (by CFA-PPar)
Case Assoc: Then N = N1 ‖ (N2 ‖ N3) and N ′ = (N1 ‖ N2) ‖ N3. The result is established by four applications
of CFA-PPar analogously to case Comm.
Case Reﬂ: Then N = N ′. Nothing to show.
Case Sym: We have (, ) Ĝ N by assumption. The induction hypothesis applied to N ′ ≡ N is
N ′ ≡ N ∧ (, ) Ĝ N ′ ⇒ (, ) Ĝ N 
Since (, ) Ĝ N and N ′ ≡ N are true, (, ) Ĝ N ′ must be true as well.
Case Trans: We have (, ) Ĝ N by assumption and can apply the induction hypothesis ﬁrst to N ≡ N ′′ to get
(, ) Ĝ N ′′, and thus a second time to N ′′ ≡ N ′ to get (, ) Ĝ N ′.
Case Comp: Then N = N1 ‖ N2 and N ′ = N ′1 ‖ N2. We have (, ) Ĝ N1 ‖ N2 and with CFA-PPar also
(, ) Ĝ N1 and (, ) Ĝ N2. We can thus apply the induction hypothesis to N1 ≡ N ′1 to get (, ) Ĝ N ′1.
Together with (, ) Ĝ N2 we have (, ) Ĝ N ′1 ‖ N2 as desired with CFA-PPar.
Case Red: We have (, ) Ĝ N by assumption and N → N ′ by Red and can apply Lemma 3.1 (1) to yield
(, ) Ĝ N ′.
Case Par: Then N = n[P1 | P2, S1 ∪ S2] and N ′ = n[P1, S1] ‖ n[P2, S2] .
(, ) Ĝ n [P1 | P2, S1 ∪ S2] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P1 | P2 ∧ ∀ U ∈ S1 ∪ S2. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P1 ∧ (, ) []
Ĝ,n
P2 ∧
∀ U ∈ S1. (U, n) ∈  ∧ ∀ U ∈ S2. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Par)
(, ) Ĝ n [P1, S1] ‖ n[P2, S2] (by CFA-Node) 
The following lemma is needed in order to simplify the proofs of Theorem 3.3 (and later also Theorem 3.4).
The lemma states that if network N can send term T from location n, then the message cache  computed by an
analysis of N contains (T , n).
Lemma 3.2. If N (T,n)!−−−→G∈T N ′ and (, ) G(T) N, then (T , n) ∈ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the inference of N (T,n)!−−−→G∈T N ′. Considering the label (T , n)!, it sufﬁces to
distinguish the following three cases:
Case Out1: Then N = n[out T . P, S] . We have (, ) G(T) n [out T . P, S] by assumption. We can apply
CFA-Node to have (, ) []G(T),n out T . P , and then CFA-Out to get (T , n) ∈ .
Case PPar: Then N = N1 ‖ N2. We have (, ) G(T) N1 ‖ N2 by assumption, and with CFA-PPar thus
(, ) G(T) N1 and (, ) G(T) N2. The premises of PPar are N1
(T ,n)1−−−−→G∈T N ′1 and N2
(T ,n)2−−−−→G∈T N ′2.
We know 1 ◦ 2 = !, hence either 1 = ! or 2 = ! by properties of ◦. For the premise labelled (T , n)!, together
with either (, ) G(T) N1 or (, ) G(T) N2, whichever is relevant, the induction hypothesis can be applied to
give (T , n) ∈ .
Case Struct: We have (, ) G(T) N by assumption. We assume the premises of Struct, in particular N ≡ M
and M (T,n)−−−→G∈T M ′. Applying Lemma 3.1 (2) to N ≡ M and (, ) G(T) N gives (, ) G(T) M . Thus, the
induction hypothesis can be applied to give (T , n) ∈ . 
Using Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, we can prove the main semantic correctness theorem, which ensures that the analysis
estimate is a safe description of what will happen during the evolution of a network.
220 S. Nanz, C. Hankin / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 203–227
Theorem 3.3 (Subject reduction).
If N (U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′ and (, ) G(T) N, then (, ) G(T) N ′.
Proof. The proof requires thatwe consider general labels (U,m).We thus show the result by induction on the inference
of M (U,m)−−−−→G∈T M ′, where M and M ′ are subterms of N and N ′, respectively.
Case Nil: Then M = M ′ = n[nil, S] . Nothing to show.
Case Out1: Then M = n[out T . P, S] and M ′ = n[P, S] . We have
(, ) G(T) n [out T . P, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []G(T),n out T . P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (, ) []G(T),n P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Out)
thus (, ) G(T) n [P, S] (by CFA-Node)
Case Out2: Then M = M ′ = n[out T . P, S] . Nothing to show.
Case In1: Then M = n[in x. P, S] and M ′ = n[P [U/x], S] . By assuming N (U,m)!−−−→G∈T N ′ and (, ) G(T) N ,
Lemma 3.2 gives (U,m) ∈  (∗). From the preconditions of In1 we know (m, n) ∈ E(G), and with Eq. (1) on
215 we have (m, n) ∈ E(G(T)) (∗∗).
(, ) G(T) n [in x. P, S] (by assumption)
thus (, ) []G(T),n in x. P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-Node)
thus (∀ (U ′,m′) ∈ . (m′, n) ∈ E(G(T)) ⇒
(, ) [U
′/x]
G(T),n P ) ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by CFA-In)
thus ((m, n) ∈ E(G(T)) ⇒ (, ) [U/x]G(T),n P ) ∧
∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by (∗))
thus (, ) [U/x]G(T),n P ∧ ∀ U ∈ S. (U, n) ∈  (by (∗∗))
thus (, ) G(T) n [P [U/x], S] (by CFA-Node)
Case In2: Then M = M ′ = n[in x. P, S] . Nothing to show.
Case Repl1: Then M = M ′ = n[!P, S] . Nothing to show.
Case PPar: Then M = M1 ‖ M2 and M ′ = M ′1 ‖ M ′2. We have (, ) G(T) M1 ‖ M2 by assumption,
and with CFA-PPar thus (, ) G(T) M1 and (, ) G(T) M2. We can use the induction hypothesis twice on
M1
(U,m)1−−−−→G∈T M ′1 and M2
(U,m)2−−−−→G∈T M ′2 to have (, ) G(T) M ′1 and (, ) G(T) M ′2. With CFA-PPar we
have (, ) G(T) M ′1 ‖ M ′2.
Case Struct: We have (, ) G(T) M by assumption. We assume the preconditions of Struct: M ≡ L,
L
(U,m)−−−−→G∈T L′, and L′ ≡ M ′. By application of Lemma 3.1 (2) to M ≡ L and (, ) G(T) M we have
(, ) G(T) L. Hence, we can apply the induction hypothesis on L
(U,m)−−−−→G∈T L′ to have (, ) G(T) L′. By
applying Lemma 3.1 (2) again, we have (, ) G(T) L′. 
The two main results describing the contents of a valid analysis estimation almost directly follow from this subject
reduction result. The ﬁrst result formalises our previous claim “if the term T may be sent from location n during
evolution of a network N , then (T , n) ∈ ”.
Theorem 3.4. If N −→∗T N ′
(T ,n)!−−−→G∈T N ′′ and (, ) G(T) N , then (T , n) ∈ .
Proof. We have (, ) G(T) N by assumption and can thus apply Theorem 3.3 ﬁnitely many times to the derivations
N −→∗T N ′ to yield (, ) G(T) N ′. With N ′
(T ,n)!−−−→G∈T N ′′ we can apply Lemma 3.2 to have (T , n) ∈ . 
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The next theorem formalises “if a term T = ε may be stored at location n during evolution of a network N , then
(T , n) ∈ ”.
Theorem 3.5. For T = ε, the following implication holds: if N ⇓Tn T and (, ) G(T) N , then (T , n) ∈ .
Proof. By induction on the inference of N ⇓Tn T , which involves only ﬁnitely many applications of Conv-Comm,
Conv-Barb, Barb-PPar, Barb-Struct, and Barb-Store, there existN ′, N ′′, P , S such that the following statements
hold:
N −→∗T N ′ ∧ N ′ ≡ N ′′ ‖ n[store T . P, S] .
Since we have (, )G(T) N by assumption, we can thus apply Theorem 3.3 ﬁnitely many times to the derivationsN −
→∗T N ′ to yield (, )G(T) N ′.We can apply Lemma 3.1 (2) to have (, )G(T) N ′′ ‖ n[store T . P, S] . Furthermore,
by CFA-PPar we have (, ) G(T) n[store T . P, S] , and we can apply CFA-Store as in the corresponding case of
the proof of Lemma 3.1 (1) to have (T , n) ∈ . 
3.4. Implementation
We have implemented our control ﬂow analysis using the succinct solver [21], a constraint solving tool. Constraints
are speciﬁed as formulae in a Horn-like fragment of ﬁrst-order predicate logic, called alternation-free least ﬁxed point
logic (ALFP), and the solver computes interpretations of predicateswhich satisfy those formulae. The analysis ofTable 7
can almost directly be translated into a generation function for ALFP formulae, however, to achieve a ﬁnite universe
of values we have to use regular grammars to represent terms, a technique introduced in [23]. The implementation is
described in more detail in [17].
4. Security analysis of mobile wireless networks
In Section 2, we have presented a calculus particularly suitable to model the behaviour of mobile wireless networks
and Section 3 established a control ﬂow analysis on terms of this calculus to overapproximate the sets of terms
transmitted and stored in a network. In this section we will show how these results can be combined into a framework
for security analysis of mobile wireless networks.
We start by pointing out differences of secure communication protocols for mobile wireless networks from the
more “traditional” security protocols for authentication, conﬁdentiality and similar properties. We will then describe
SAODV, a simpliﬁed version of the combination of the routing protocolAODV [26] and its security extension SAODV
[14]. SAODV motivates the deﬁnition of a consistency condition for networks, a building block for routing security.
The condition is based on the notion of mediated equivalence, developed in Section 2.4, and we show a result relating
our analysis estimate tomediated equivalent networks. Our framework can thus be used for automated security analysis.
We conclude the section with the analysis results for SAODV showing that the protocol is insecure, and present a
simple attack.
4.1. Security protocols vs. secure communication protocols
In Section 1.1we have described themain operational characteristics of communication protocols formobile wireless
networking. Here, we want to clarify their security characteristics. For this purpose, it is helpful to compare them with
the more common security protocols for authentication, conﬁdentiality and similar properties. This is done in the
following with respect to properties and modelling aspects:
Security properties: Security protocols are designed to achieve one or more speciﬁc security properties. In contrast,
communication protocols provide network services which are not related to any kind of security property. Securing
such protocols means to ensure that these network services can be provided unconditionally, even in an adversarial
environment.
Security modelling: Security protocols are usually end-to-end, meaning that only the endpoints of communications
are modelled and the environment is replaced by the Dolev-Yao attacker. For communication protocols, the states of the
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Table 8
Subroutines of SAODV speciﬁed in CBS
1 SendRREQ(dstip, ip) def=
2 out RREQ(dstip, ip, ip,PubKey(ip),
3 Sign(PrivKey(ip),REQTuple(dstip, ip,PubKey(ip))))
4
5 ReceiveRREQ(ip) def=
6 in RREQ(; dstip, origip, sndip, pubkey, sig).
7 case pubkey of PubKey(origip; )
8 asymdec sig pubkey REQTuple(dstip, origip, pubkey)
9 store Route(origip, ip, sndip).
10 if dstip = ip then
11 out RREP(dstip, origip, sndip, ip,PubKey(ip),
12 Sign(PrivKey(ip),REPTuple(dstip, origip,PubKey(ip))))
13 else
14 out RREQ(dstip, origip, ip, pubkey, sig)
15 else nil
16 else nil
17
18 ReceiveRREP(ip) def=
19 in RREP(; dstip, origip, addrip, sndip, pubkey, sig).
20 if addrip = ip then
21 case pubkey of PubKey(dstip; )
22 asymdec sig pubkey REPTuple(dstip, origip, pubkey)
23 store Route(dstip, ip, sndip).
24 if origip = ip then
25 nil
26 else
27 read Route(origip, ip; nexthop)
28 out RREP(dstip, origip, nexthop, ip, pubkey, sig)
29 else nil
30 else nil
31 else nil
32 else nil
intermediate nodes and their connectivity matter and cannot be abstracted away. Consequentially, the attacker should
be limited by the environment conditions as well.
Before applying these insights to the deﬁnition of a consistency condition for routing security in Section 4.3, we will
now specify a concrete routing protocol for later analysis in our framework.
4.2. SAODV
The AODV protocol [26], also standardised by the IETF as RFC 3561 [25], is a routing protocol for mobile ad hoc
networks in which a node tries to ﬁnd a route to a destination only if needed (on-demand). Its operation is based on
routing tables and requires that each node stores a “vector” of direction (the next hop) and distance (number of hops)
for a particular destination. SAODV [14], in the process of standardisation by the IETF [13], is a protocol extension of
AODV to secure the route discovery mechanism.
We illustrate the use of our speciﬁcation and analysis framework with SAODV, a simpliﬁed version of the combi-
nation of the two protocols which describes only the route discovery step and no route maintenance and concentrates
on the authentication mechanism of SAODV.
Operation: In Table 8 we show the main subroutines of SAODV, modelled in CBS. We describe the operation of
the protocol by referring to this model.
If a node ns (the source) needs to communicate with another node nd (the destination) for which it has no routing
information, ns initiates a route discovery process. A route discovery comprises the following steps:
Sending RREQs: ns initiates the route discovery by broadcasting a route request RREQ which contains the
destination IP address, the source IP address, the IP address of the immediate sender, the public key of the
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source, and a signature of message type, destination IP, source IP, and source public key, with the private key
of the source. In our notation, this amounts to the message RREQ(nd, ns, ns,PubKey(ns), sig), where sig is
Sign(PrivKey(ns),REQTuple(nd, ns,PubKey(ns))).
Receiving RREQs: Every node n receiving a route request RREQ(nd, ns, ni, pubkey, sig) will ﬁrst check whether the
provided public key belongs to the source. For this, the existence of a public-key infrastructure is assumed; this can be
modelled elegantly by using the respective IP address as seed in the public/private key generation. It will then check
whether the source signed the tuple REQTuple(nd, ns, pubkey) with its private key. If one of these checks fails, n will
abort. Otherwise, it makes an entry into its routing table to provide a reverse route leading to the source. The entry
reads Route(ns, n, ni) and means that whenever a packet addressed to ns arrives at n, it will be forwarded to the next
hop ni, the immediate sender of the RREQ.
n will then check whether it is the destination itself, i.e. nd = n. If so, the n will send out a route reply RREP,
containing its IP address, the source IP address, the IP address of the next hop of the reverse path (the addressee, in
our case the immediate sender ni), its public key, and a signature of the tuple of non-mutable ﬁelds with its private key.
RREP(nd, ns, ni, nd,PubKey(nd), sig′), where sig′ is Sign(PrivKey(nd),REPTuple(nd, ns,PubKey(nd)))
If nd = n, n will rebroadcast the request, changing only the IP address of the immediate sender to its own IP:
RREQ(nd, ns, n,PubKey(ns), sig).
Receiving RREPs: Every node n receiving a route reply message RREP(nd, ns, na, ni, pubkey′, sig′) checks whether
it is the addressee, i.e. na = n. This implements a unicast on top of the broadcast, as all nodes will just drop the
message if they are not addressed. Otherwise, n will check whether the provided public key belongs to the destina-
tion, and whether the destination signed REPTuple(nd, ns, pubkey′). Again, n will abort on failure of any of these
checks. Otherwise, it makes an entry into its routing table to provide a forward route leading to the destination,
Route(nd, n, ni).
If nwas the initiator of theRREQ in the ﬁrst place, i.e. ns = n, it can now start sending data packets to nd. Otherwise,
n retrieves the route table entry Route(ns, n, nx) for the reverse route to ns from the store to get the next hop nx on the
reverse route. It then rebroadcasts the route reply as RREP(nd, ns, nx, n, pubkey′, sig′).
4.3. Security model for routing protocols
From the previous section,we can draw the following conclusions for routing table-based protocols such asSAODV:
every node is a reactive system in the sense that it offers a discrete interface to the environment and will accept and
process any incoming message matching certain formats. It will thus accept messages of honest nodes and attackers
alike. However, a node will only commit to this information if it updates its routing table accordingly. The ability of
nodes to ﬁlter out malicious information at this stage determines the degree of security a protocol is offering. But when
can such information be considered as malicious? A minimal requirement seems to be that the information should
accurately represent the network topology. This leads to the deﬁnition of the following condition.
4.3.1. A consistency condition for routing networks
We deﬁne a consistency mediator T : T → T such that T(U) evaluates to ε whenever the topology is “correctly
represented” and toU otherwise.As different routing protocols will have different data representations for routing infor-
mation, a formalisation of “correct representation” is only possible in the context of a particular protocol speciﬁcation.
This is shown here for SAODV.
Example 4.1 (Consistency mediator for SAODV).
saodvT (U) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ε if for U = Route(nd, n1, n2) there exist locations n3, . . . , nk such that nk = nd and
∀ i ∈ {1 . . . k − 1}. ∃ G ∈ T. (ni, ni+1) ∈ G
U otherwise.
Recall that Route(nd, n1, n2) means in SAODV that packets addressed to nd and arriving at n1 will be forwarded
to n2 as the next hop. The deﬁnition then says the network topology should allow for a path from n1 to nd via n2. Using
the notion of a consistency mediator, we can deﬁne the following property for routing networks.
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Deﬁnition 4.2 (Topology consistency). For network N and network topology T, let T the consistency mediator for N .
N is said to be topology consistent under attacker M if the equivalence N TT (N ‖ M) holds.
Note that, from the deﬁnition of mediated equivalence, M (representing additional, possibly malicious nodes) is
allowed to store anything since the convergence predicate is only checked for all n ∈ V (N) ∩ V (N ‖ M) = V (N).
However, if interaction of N with M in network N ‖ M causes inconsistent information to be stored by nodes of
N , the equivalence in Deﬁnition 4.2 cannot be established. Furthermore, the deﬁnition does not imply the topology
consistency of N , meaning that faults in the protocol are not misinterpreted as attacker actions.
4.3.2. Automated security analysis
Proving the topology consistency condition by hand is error prone for large protocols. We will thus use the analysis
framework of Section 3 to establish these results. The following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.3. For all networks N , M and simple mediators , the following implication holds: If (, ) G(T) N ‖ M
and ∀ (U,m) ∈ . (U) = ε, then N T N ‖ M .
Proof. By Deﬁnition 2.14, we know N T N ‖ M iff N T N ‖ M and N ‖ M T N . Since  is simple, i.e.
(U) ∈ {ε, U} for all U , the ﬁrst inclusion can be proved by Theorem 2.17.
It remains to show N ‖ M T N . By deﬁnition of T , where we note that V (N) ∩ V (N ‖ M) = V (N), we have
to show the following result:
∀ U. ∀ n ∈ V (N). N ‖ M ⇓Tn U ⇒ N ⇓Tn (U).
To prove this by contradiction, we assume its negation:
∃ U. ∃ n ∈ V (N). N ‖ M ⇓Tn U ∧ ¬(N ⇓Tn (U)).
Since ¬(N ⇓Tn (U)) it must be that (U) = ε (∗), because N ⇓Tn ε is true for any N . (∗) allows us to apply
Theorem 3.5 to N ‖ M ⇓Tn U and (, ) G(T) N ‖ M , both of which we have by assumption, to yield (U, n) ∈ .
However, we know by assumption that ∀ (U ′,m) ∈ . (U ′) = ε, in particular (U) = ε. This is a contradiction
to (∗). 
4.3.3. Attackers
It is important to note that—other than in the spi calculus [2], for instance—the algebraic laws of encryption and
decryption are not hardcoded into the operational semantics of the calculus. It is thus easily possible (as it would be
for example in CSP [28]) to write a process violating perfect cryptography, e.g. to read the contents of an encrypted
message without the appropriate key. This is due to the ﬂexibility to deﬁne new operations which is offered by CBS
and does not pose a problem, because a correct notion of the attacker can be deﬁned straightforwardly a simple type
discipline which is described in the following. Assume the set of function symbols F is partitioned into the following
subsets:
Foneway one-way functions
Ftwoway two-way functions
Fsecret secret functions
Fmessage message constructors
One- and two-way functions signify, as commonly found in cryptographic contexts, functions which are thought
to be very difﬁcult to reverse or are easily reversed, respectively. Secret functions are introduced for more speciﬁc
modelling purposes: for example, in Section 2.3 we have introduced functions PrivKey and PubKey to yield key pairs
for asymmetric encryption when applied to a seed. These functions are in general not to be applied by any protocol
participant and therefore kept secret from the attacker. Message constructors are functions which yield messages of
valid format within the particular network in question. Conceptually, they are two-way functions, but we decide to
introduce them at this point as a simple optimisation to reduce the amount of useless messages created by the attacker.
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Example 4.4. Assume that some protocol employs the functions Pair, Hash, Msg, AsymEnc, PubKey, and PrivKey
(with their obvious meanings). To specify the attacker properly, an adequate partitioning of this set of functions is
given by:
Hash,AsymEnc ∈ Foneway
Pair ∈ Ftwoway
PubKey,PrivKey ∈ Fsecret
Msg ∈ Fmessage
We can then deﬁne an attacker process PA as follows:
P1(f )
def= !in f (; x1, . . . , xarity(f )). store x1. . . . store xarity(f )
P2(f )
def= !read x1. . . . read xarity(f ). out f (x1, . . . , xarity(f ))
P3(f )
def= !read f (; x1, . . . , xarity(f )) store x1. . . . store xarity(f ) else nil
P4(f )
def= !read x1. . . . read xarity(f ). store f (x1, . . . , xarity(f ))
P5
def= !read x1. read x2. symdec x1 x2 x store x else nil
| !read x1. read x2. asymdec x1 x2 x store x else nil
PA
def= (|f∈Fmessage P1(f ) | P2(f )) | (|f∈Ftwoway P3(f )) | (|f∈Foneway∪Ftwoway P4(f )) | P5
This follows the Dolev-Yao formalisation in the sense that PA can
• receive messages and add their components to the store,
• send messages constructed from the store,
• add arguments of 2-way functions to the store,
• apply functions to arguments from the store, and
• perform decryption if keys are in the store.
However, if we add the attacker to a networkN to yieldN ‖ nA[PA, ε] , a major difference to theDolev-Yao approach
is evident: when the network evolves, the attacker is just an ordinary node which has to abide by the topology T. In
general, the attacker will neither be able to intercept all messages on the network nor inject messages at all locations.We
believe that this reﬂects accurately the situation in wireless networks: all participants have to abide by purely physical
restrictions imposed by radio transmission ranges. In any case, it gives the protocol analyst more freedom, as the classic
Dolev-Yao case can be achieved by a careful modelling of T.
4.4. Analysis results for SAODV
The analysis of SAODV in a simple scenario shows that the system is indeed not topology consistent. Using the
subroutines of Table 8, we can deﬁne the following processes and nodes:
MsgHdl(ip) def=ReceiveRREQ(ip) | ReceiveRREP(ip)
N1(ip,dstip)
def= ip[SendRREQ(dstip, ip) | MsgHdl(ip), ε]
N2(ip)
def= ip[MsgHdl(ip), ε]
The message handler MsgHdl represents the main protocol routine. Both N1 and N2 are parametrised nodes running
this process, however, N1 is in addition given the capability to initiate a route request. Our scenario then consists of a
network of three nodes
Nsaodv = N1(n1, n2) ‖ N2(n2) ‖ nA[PA, ε]
where PA is deﬁned as in Section 4.3.3 and represents the attack process. Furthermore, a network topology T is deﬁned
such that E(G(T)) = {(n1, nA), (n2, nA)}, thus n1 and n2 are never directly connected.
If (, ) G(T) Nsaodv, then Fig. 1 shows the terms contained in  (computed automatically by our implementation)
and their graphical interpretation.
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Fig. 1. Attacker induces topology inconsistency.
Fig. 2. Topologically consistent network of honest nodes.
Here, the doubly dotted line represents the abstract network topology, and labelled arrows represent the belief of the
nodes about the topology. As the attacker can hide its own name by spooﬁng sending addresses, the attacker makes n1
and n2 believe that they are directly connected, which contradicts the topological situation. Thus, the equivalence of
Deﬁnition 4.2 does not hold.
As a comparison, Fig. 2 shows the analysis for a network of honest nodes N1(n1, n2) ‖ N2(n2) ‖ N2(n3) with
E(G(T)) = {(n1, n3), (n2, n3)}. The network is topology consistent, as node n1 correctly believes that there is a route
to n2 via n3, and this holds analogously for node n2.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the broadcast calculus CBS and a static analysis to formally analyse secure mobile
wireless networks. While at ﬁrst glance this setting seems to resemble traditional security protocol analysis, we have
pointed out that its complications call for new modelling formalisms as well as novel security properties, which are
provided and expressible in our framework.
Several directions for future work suggest themselves: for example, the strength of the restrained Dolev-Yao attacker
needs more investigation, e.g. under which conditions multiple such attackers are more powerful than a single one and
whether a hierarchy of such attackers can be established.Also, the topology consistency property alone does not directly
imply what one would understand under “routing security”. The challenge is to ﬁnd a set of properties implying this
goal. Furthermore, it seems there might be a reasonable margin to improve the precision of our static analysis (and then
potentially prove more properties), for example, by reﬁning the topology abstraction by using directed and weighted
graphs.
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